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Abstract 
 
Patronage, expansively conceived as covering all forms of bias and discrimination, is 
pervasive in organisations and professions, including academia. Four key types of 
academic patronage operate through decisions made, processes used, assistance 
given to individuals and personal interactions. Some forms of patronage, especially 
discrimination on the basis of gender and ethnicity, have come under sustained 
criticism and are officially stigmatised. However, policies for equal opportunity and 
against conflicts of interest have only begun to address more personal forms of 
patronage. Some forms of patronage, such as supporting one’s research students, 
are common and treated as normal; systems without such patronage would seem 
strange. Looking at patronage in a broad sense can be useful in highlighting abuses 
that escape the usual lenses of anti-discrimination. 
 
Introduction  
 
At the University of New South Wales, a scandal was reported concerning the 
Educational Testing Centre (Hicks, 2005; see also Audit Office, 2001). There were 
allegations of favouritism and bullying. One fact stood out: one quarter of the 
employees were relatives of each other. This seemed to be a case of nepotism. 
Could they all have been appointed on merit? 
 
This may be an extreme example, but milder forms are pervasive in nearly every 
organisation, including universities (McNamee & Miller, 2004). I use the word 
“patronage” to refer to favouritism based on attributes not connected with merit or 
performance. The person favoured can be a relative, friend, spouse, protégé or 
student, or share the same gender, ethnicity, social class, age, religion, political views 
or other beliefs. 
 
This is an expansive definition of patronage, incorporating all sorts of bias and special 
privilege: see Table 1. Although the word “patronage” has some benevolent 
connotations — as in a patron of the arts — it also suggests favouritism. Even in 
something seemingly as innocuous of being a patron of a restaurant — a regular 
customer — there is always choice involved, with someone potentially gaining 
advantage over another. 
 
Most attention in academic studies is given to specific types of discrimination, 
especially those based on gender and ethnicity. My aim here is to use a broader 
perspective to give some insight into common processes, problems, alternatives and 
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strategies and, in particular, to highlight some common practices that potentially might 
be considered improper. 
 
Table 1.  
Some common terms as used in this paper 
 
Bias: treating entities unequally using a non-universal value system. 
Conflict of interest: a situation in which a decision-maker, due to personal or other 
relationships, has competing loyalties and is potentially perceived by others as biased 
or compromised. 
Cronyism: favouritism for friends and associates. 
Discrimination: bias or unfair treatment, usually on the basis of membership in a 
category such as gender, class or religion. 
Equal opportunity: non-discriminatory treatment of individuals, typically in relation to 
jobs or careers. 
Favouritism: synonym for patronage. 
In-group: a group giving greater advantages to members than non-members; a clique. 
Insiders: members of an in-group. 
Merit: worthiness based on capability or performance treated independently of 
personal characteristics or group membership. 
Meritocratic: based on merit. 
Outsiders: non-members of an in-group, typically those working with or competing 
with in-group members. 
Patronage: any form of bias or discrimination, either by individuals or groups. 
Prejudice: an attitude or value system involving bias, often towards particular groups. 
Unfairness: an unequal outcome without a justification using universal criteria. 
 
I start by describing key modes of patronage and give examples of avenues for 
patronage. I then present arguments for and against academic patronage, describe 
some systems with and without patronage and present several possible challenges to 
patronage. I use the example of honours thesis examining to illustrate struggles over 
a practice with considerable potential for patronage. 
 
My aim is to use a broad lens to capture types of patronage not fitting into the usual 
categories of discrimination and equal opportunity. That means I do not cover several 
topics worthy of analysis, such as the reproduction of patronage — whether and how 
recipients later become dispensers of patronage — and the social processes by which 
forms of patronage rise or decline over time. 
 
Patronage practices vary enormously internationally. In some countries, patronage is 
highly entrenched, with god-professors acting as gatekeepers into an academic 
career: no one without high-level personal endorsement has any chance of getting 
ahead. In some places, this becomes what might be called corruption, with university 
places available for purchase, out-groups denied access to study and excluded from 
academic jobs, degrees given as favours to powerful figures, and senior academics 
chosen on political rather than academic grounds. In other places — Australia, for 
example — where student selection and staff hiring operate with more observance of 
merit principles and where anti-discrimination legislation is taken seriously, patronage 
typically takes less blatant forms. Here I look at these issues from a general 
perspective: the case study is Australian, but the frameworks are meant to apply to 
practice in a variety of higher education systems. 
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Types of patronage 
 
Avenues for patronage abound. Consider, for example, allocating offices. Whoever 
makes decisions about which person gets which office can use this power to dispense 
favours, giving the largest or most attractive offices to insiders. If you are assessing a 
grant application or refereeing an article by someone you like, you can give it a more 
favourable evaluation. If you are deciding the order of authors on a publication, you 
can manoeuvre to make a favoured person the first author, or even add the name of 
someone who didn’t do any work, as a favour to that person, in what is called gift 
authorship (LaFollette, 1992, pp. 91-107). If you make decisions about who teaches 
what, you can assign desirable classes or lighter loads to favoured individuals. Every 
little thing in academia can be involved, such as priority in having your computer fixed, 
the words used when your work is cited in a paper and the tone of voice with which 
you are greeted1. 
 
To list avenues is simply to point out that patronage is possible, not that it necessarily 
occurs or is inappropriate. Whether an action is considered appropriate or 
inappropriate depends on the culture in an organisation and society. In some 
academic systems, patronage is the standard way of doing things and peers would 
consider it highly unorthodox – even dangerous – to support an outsider instead of the 
usual insider. On the other hand, when expectations of equal treatment prevail – in 
other words, when meritocracy is the official doctrine – then giving favours may be 
stigmatised, sometimes through policies and guidelines and sometimes through peer 
expectations. 
 
If patronage exists within an organisation or network, favourites are advantaged and 
hence others are disadvantaged. Often it is useful to divide members of a group into 
three groups: insiders, neutrals and outsiders. Insiders are the favourites. Neutrals are 
those who are treated on their merits for the most part, except when competing 
against insiders. Outsiders are actively discriminated against. Outsiders may include 
critics and challengers, stigmatised groups such as ethnic minorities, and those who 
do not fit in with the dominant style. 
 
Many academics are members of two or more communities. For example, it is 
possible to be an insider within a department, a neutral in relation to university-level 
politics and an outsider in international professional circles. 
 
Methods of active discrimination are just as varied as methods of patronage. They 
include subtle put-downs, petty harassment, lack of support, ostracism, and direct 
attacks including public humiliations, formal reprimands, demotions and dismissals. 
Often the easiest way to get rid of outsiders is to make life unpleasant so they leave in 
a way that looks voluntary. Potent techniques include preventing them from teaching 
desirable classes, giving them no recognition for achievements and denying them 
tenure. 
 
One dynamic underlying patronage is control through obligation: by dispensing 
favours, others may feel indebted and are more likely to support the patron2. For 
example, members in a research team may co-author papers and cite each other’s 
work, excluding outsiders from both collaboration and citations. Senior figures in the 
team assist junior researchers, who are likely to reciprocate, especially when they rely 
on continued opportunities for references, collaboration and access to equipment. 
Independent researchers have a hard time competing against such an in-group. 
 
Patronage can be categorised into four main types (see Table 2). The first type is 
making decisions that favour insiders, for example in making appointments and 
awarding grants. Such actions are fairly obvious and, as such, may be susceptible to 
challenge in an equal-opportunity environment. 
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Table 2.  
Types of academic patronage 
 
 
 
The second type of patronage is biasing the processes through which decisions are 
made, for example appointing insiders to a selection committee or, more subtly, 
establishing a process that will make appointment of such people to a selection 
committee more likely. For example, if most full professors are insiders, then requiring 
a committee to have a majority of full professors will create a bias, although the 
procedure itself is not biased towards individuals, only full professors. The advantage 
of this type of patronage action is that outside observers cannot readily see any bias: 
an intimate knowledge of the group or network is required to understand what is 
happening. 
 
The third type of patronage is assistance to preferred individuals to develop their 
knowledge or skills. An example is providing inside knowledge about what is 
happening in the organisation, how decisions are actually made, the strengths and 
weaknesses of individuals, and likely developments in the future. This sort of 
information can greatly advantage those who have it. It is patronage only if it is inside 
knowledge, namely knowledge that others don’t have. Sometimes information is made 
publicly available, in meetings or emails, but only insiders have the ability to decode it: 
additional knowledge is needed for grasping the significance of the information. 
Providing skills to preferred individuals is another facet of this type of patronage. This 
can include how to deal with conflicts, control emotions, present oneself in interviews, 
respond to challenges and much else. Again, if skill training is available to anyone on 
a genuine open-invitation basis, this does not constitute patronage. 
 
The fourth type of patronage is personal interaction, for example the way a person is 
greeted in a private meeting or public occasion. It includes what is said, ranging from 
open praise to derogatory comments, and, just as importantly, the way things are 
said, including tone of voice and body language. Patronage at the interpersonal level 
is often quite subtle and can be hard to detect, easy to misinterpret, impossible to 
prove and easily contested. Despite its subtleties, personal interaction can be a 
powerful motivator for insiders and disincentive for outsiders. 
 
It hardly seems fair to count the twist of a smile or the tone of a comment as 
manifestations of patronage; yet such minor features of personal interaction should 
not be discounted because of the difficulties of measurement and documentation. It is 
natural for most people to respond more positively to those they like and support and 
to those who respond positively to them. Interpersonal interaction often lays the 
foundation for other, more overt, types of patronage. 
 
Table 2 also lists disadvantages for outsiders. In many cases, the word 
“disadvantages” is far too mild: the impact of prejudice, discrimination, bullying and 
other unfair and adverse treatment can be devastating (Twale & De Luca, 2008; 
Westhues, 2004; Wilke, 1979). 
Type of patronage Advantage for insiders Disadvantage for outsiders 
Decision-making Advantageous decisions Adverse decisions 
Processes Biased procedures; 
stacked committees 
Biased procedures; stacked 
committees 
Assistance Advice; support; coaching; 
inside knowledge 
Absence or inadequacy of 
assistance 
Personal interaction Encouragement; stimulus; 
bolstering of reputation 
Discouragement; ostracism; 
bullying; undermining 
© Internati nal Journal for Educational Integrity Vol. 5 No. 1 June, 2 09 p. 3–19
7 © International Journal for Educational Integrity Vol. 2 No. 2 December 2006 pp. xx-xx  ISSN 1833-2595  
Some avenues for academic patronage, grouped according to the type of patronage 
involved, are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  
Some avenues for academic patronage 
 
Decision-making 
Allocating offices 
Approving sabbatical, conference leave and other leave 
Approving visitors 
Assessing grant applications  
Assessing theses  
Assigning projects to students 
Assigning students to supervisors 
Assigning teaching  
Awarding internal grants  
Awarding promotions or salary increases 
Awarding scholarships  
Deciding on co-authorship 
Making appointments  
Refereeing articles  
 
Processes 
Being a dean, head or other formal decision-maker 
Choosing members of a selection committee 
Choosing members of allocation committees 
Handling complaints and grievances 
Sitting on an appeal body  
 
Assistance 
Giving individuals information about opportunities for publication, awards and grants 
Inviting people to apply for jobs 
Inviting people to take up administrative posts 
Providing individuals with information about operations, plans and other people 
Providing individuals with training, assistance and guidance with appearance, 
speaking and strategies 
Writing references 
 
Personal interaction 
Defending individuals against attack 
Giving individuals encouragement and support  
Mentioning individuals favourably at meetings 
 
Individual instances of patronage may occur randomly and without any coordination: 
advantaging a friend here, gender-based bias there, preference for one’s student in 
yet another circumstance. On the other hand, when instances of patronage are 
systematic or coordinated, it is possible to speak of a patronage system or patronage 
network. There are two basic types, centralised and decentralised. In centralised 
systems, most favours are dispensed from a single individual or small core group; in 
decentralised systems, favours are dispensed at any level and by anyone according 
to common principles, whether overt or unspoken. 
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Some special types of patronage systems are listed in Table 4. This list is not 
exhaustive, nor are the types all mutually exclusive. 
 
Table 4.  
Some types of patronage systems 
 
Anti-performance: high achievers are marginalised or discriminated against because 
they threaten second-raters running the system. 
Bullying: out-group members are harassed until they leave or — in some systems — 
join the in-group. 
Discrimination: in-group membership is dependent on an attribute such as gender, 
ethnicity, nationality, class, discipline or educational background. 
Dynastic: patronage is organised around maintaining a dominant group over time. 
Godfather: patronage is dispensed by a single individual who expects total loyalty in 
return. 
Information: insiders are told what is happening and why, giving them advantages; 
outsiders are deprived of information or fed disinformation. 
Initiation: joining the in-group requires participating in rites of passage. 
Migratory: a clique moves from place to place, appointing in-group members, either 
seeking richer pickings or escaping sanctions for abuses. 
Rule-based: patronage is dispensed according to rules that systematically 
discriminate against out-groups. 
 
Academic patronage can be considered a facet of in-group preference found at 
various levels, as shown in Table 5. Psychologically, it can be seen as a manifestation 
of the way people’s sense of identity relates to their membership of groups that are 
socially significant (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The contrary process is called here 
“equity”. 
 
Table 5.  
Forms of patronage and equity at various levels of social organisation 
 
 
 
In this picture, patronage is simply another name for manifestations of in-group bias. 
The different levels of patronage intersect and overlap, as shown by patronage in 
academia. The most common general level of organisation in academia is the 
university: patronage at this level means bias in favour of students, graduates or 
employees of one’s own university. But within a university, individuals pursue their 
Level of organisation Form of patronage Form of equity 
Self Self-patronage: egoism; 
self-promotion 
Altruism 
Family Nepotism Meritocracy; equal opportu-
nity 
Teams, firms, groups, 
religions 
Loyalty; partisanship; 
team spirit 
Serving the public interest; 
equal opportunity 
Gender Patriarchy; sexism Gender equality 
Country Patriotism, nationalism Global citizenship 
Human Species Domination of nature; 
human chauvinism 
Animal liberation; species 
egalitarianism 
Life Life chauvinism Deep ecology 
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own careers (self-patronage), and there can be bias based on gender, nationality and 
other characteristics. At yet a different level, there can be bias against non-university 
people. 
 
Arguments against and for patronage 
 
Patronage, by definition, is a violation of the merit principle: insiders are given 
advantages not deserved by their performance. In an equal-opportunity or meritocratic 
environment, this is the principal argument against patronage. There are some other 
arguments too. Some forms of patronage involve a conflict of interest, for example 
when academics make decisions affecting others with whom they have close personal 
relationships. Patronage can lead to undesirable consequences, including selection 
for mediocrity, formation of cliques whose self-seeking behaviour reduces 
performance, and a lack of diversity that causes a loss of creativity and insight. 
 
Strangely enough, patronage is potentially damaging to patronees, the recipients of 
favours3. In the eyes of others, patronees may be perceived as unworthy precisely 
because they have sometimes received favours, even when in reality their 
performance could justify their success. Furthermore, the personal development of 
patronees may be stultified by an abundance of largess: they may not be presented 
with sufficient challenge on the path to advancement, missing opportunities for 
learning that arise from struggling against adversity. 
 
Arguments for patronage are harder to articulate, at least when merit has become the 
dominant rhetoric. The usual argument for patronage is that insiders are better, but 
this isn’t an argument for patronage but actually a use of the merit principle to deny 
and disguise patronage. A true argument for patronage justifies support for insiders 
when they are less accomplished than others. The most common justification is 
implicit: it’s a tradition or an expectation. The eldest son inherits the family business 
because it’s always been done that way: it’s assumed to be right and proper; it’s a 
cultural expectation. 
 
When academics receive helpful mentoring, co-author papers with supervisors and 
obtain jobs with the assistance of good references from supervisors or other 
supporters, it is natural for them to continue the same sorts of practices, for example 
by seeking scholarships for favoured students and offering them work as research 
assistants and tutors, and, when in a more senior position, providing opportunities for 
junior academics. In this sort of way, patronage is reproduced and seems entirely 
natural: it seems to be the way academia operates and therefore needs no 
justification4. 
 
Within an academic context, patronage may be justified on the ground that insiders fit 
in: they help maintain a harmonious work environment and thus increase productivity. 
A dysfunctional personality may disrupt the group. The trouble is that this rationale is 
easily used to discriminate on all sorts of grounds. 
 
Another argument is that insiders are trustworthy. They will support the goals of the 
organisation. They are team players. They won’t rock the boat. This sort of rationale 
may be more common at higher management levels in which social characteristics 
are more important and performance is harder to judge as an individual 
accomplishment. 
 
Another argument for patronage is that it works: if income or student numbers or 
publications are buoyant, this provides an apparent justification for prevailing patterns 
of internal decision-making. However, seldom is there any benchmarking with other 
units that have equivalent starting points and similar financial and other support. 
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There seem to be few empirical studies of the actual performance of patronage 
systems. 
 
Systems with patronage 
 
In any given academic organisation, it is likely that some types of patronage will be 
stigmatised and rare while others are accepted and common. Nepotism, with family 
members gaining advantages over more qualified outsiders, is not so common at the 
level of academic appointments. It is an obvious form of patronage and hence easier 
to challenge. 
 
Gender-based patronage is one of the most long-standing forms, directly deriving 
from patriarchy. In what is called homosocial reproduction, men appoint others who 
are like themselves — and that usually means men (Kanter, 1977). In the “two-person 
career”, wives or partners assist men to succeed in an academic career (Fowlkes, 
1980; Papanek, 1973), with a few instances involving a reversal of the sexes. In peer 
review, women may be judged more harshly than men (Wenneras & Wold, 1997). 
Most men receive advice and mentoring from other men whereas women are more 
likely to be excluded from support systems (Bagilhole & Goode, 2001). At higher 
levels of management, male characteristics and styles are commonly considered 
superior. Despite the efforts of feminists, including decades of efforts for equal 
opportunity and affirmative action, women are still disadvantaged, especially when 
they are parents. However, within this overall picture, there are pockets of patronage 
advantaging women, instigated by other women and sometimes by men. 
 
Decades ago, women were considered to be intellectually inferior and barred from 
many occupations: academic patronage for males was institutionalised. Although 
beliefs in male superiority persist in a few disciplines such as physics, today in many 
countries official policies support equal opportunity. 
 
A similar history applies to discrimination on the basis of family, class, religion, 
ethnicity, schooling, disability and sexuality. Each of these still occurs, but in equal-
opportunity and meritocratic environments are increasingly stigmatised through official 
policies and prevailing attitudes. 
 
In some places, a more recent addition to the list of officially stigmatised forms of 
patronage is that based on so-called close personal relationships, of which sexual and 
romantic relationships are a common type but by no means the only form. A 
friendship can be a close personal relationship. If your best friend is applying for a job, 
you are unlikely to be, or be seen to be, an objective member of the selection 
committee. However, friendships are hard to quantify, so bias on this score can be 
hard to identify and police. 
 
Patronage frequently occurs on the basis of disciplines and theoretical orientations. In 
a school of philosophy and politics, philosophers are likely to favour appointment of 
more philosophers rather than political scientists. In an economics department, 
econometricians are likely to support appointment of more econometricians rather 
than political economists. Likewise with pure mathematicians, organic chemists and 
environmental lawyers. Battles within and between departments often follow the lines 
of disciplines, specialities and allegiance to methods and perspectives (Becher & 
Trowler, 2001). 
 
One of the accepted forms of patronage is support for one’s research students, 
including training, advice, references and job opportunities. It seems natural to give 
assistance to your own students; this is especially tempting when they are pursuing 
research aligned to your own. Is this inevitably patronage in the sense of giving these 
students an unfair advantage? Not always: if all students have equal access to quality 
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supervision, then no one obtains a special advantage. If every supervisor writes 
equally objective references and has the same level of connections for helping 
students obtain jobs, then no one obtains a special advantage. But of course this is 
seldom the case. Supervisors with experience, power, prestige and well-developed 
networks can do far more for students: their advice and insights give their students a 
special edge in their careers and their colleagues and supporters are more likely to 
give these students opportunities. Furthermore, when students follow in the footsteps 
of their supervisors in terms of research ideas and style, supervisors are more likely to 
be helpful. (A rebellious student is far less likely to obtain a high level of support.) So 
in practice supervision is commonly linked to patronage and sometimes to patronage 
networks based on loyalty to individuals and research traditions. 
 
Struggles against patronage occur at several levels. The narrowest level is 
challenging an objectionable instance of patronage, for example appointment of an 
under-qualified man over highly qualified women applicants. Next are challenges to 
forms of patronage, for example trying to reduce discrimination against women by 
encouraging women to apply for jobs and ensuring that women sit on all selection 
committees. Finally there are challenges to standard practices that seek to redefine 
them as unacceptable. This occurred when exclusion of women from academic posts 
was challenged. It conceivably could happen with supervisor patronage, for example 
by saying that supervisors cannot write references for students, the way that today it 
is seen as inappropriate for a parent to write a reference for a child seeking an 
academic post. 
 
Systems without patronage 
 
In this picture, the concept of patronage is so broad that it is hard to imagine a world 
without it, so it is worth giving a few examples. In buying groceries, most customers 
receive no special deals. In a small corner shop, the owner might give family 
members free or low-cost food — a classic form of patronage. But in supermarket 
chains, these sorts of special favours are less common; indeed, family members of 
the store manager may receive no gifts, certainly not openly, because it might alienate 
regular paying customers and expose the manager to discipline from higher-level 
executives. In some shops, employees can obtain special deals on merchandise, but 
this is separate from favouritism toward customers with connections. 
 
In buying a meal at a restaurant, patronage occurs when special favours — better 
service, better food, complimentary meals — are offered to people because of who 
they are, for example family members, police or politicians. In a high-patronage 
establishment or environment, all sorts of people obtain special favours. If the police 
receive free meals in a de facto exchange for not prosecuting violations of by-laws, 
this can be called corruption. Patronage is less likely in highly bureaucratised, high-
volume restaurants like McDonald’s. 
 
An academic example is students obtaining admission to universities. In a fully 
bureaucratised process with no special favours, every student is treated identically: 
admission does not depend on who the student is, only on their grades, test scores 
and other accomplishments. Many universities have forms of institutionalised 
patronage, such as easier admission for children of graduates (a common practice in 
the US, called “legacy preferences”), for local students compared to foreign ones and 
for students able to afford high fees. Out-groups may be discriminated against, for 
example on the basis of ethnicity or religion. There can also be individual patronage, 
for example easier admission for children of the rich and powerful, especially relatives 
of generous donors. 
 
These examples suggest a negative correlation between patronage and the 
processes of rationalisation, bureaucratisation and marketisation. The more an 
© Internati nal Journal for Educational Integrity Vol. 5 No. 1 June, 2 09 p. 3–19
12 © International Journal for Educational Integrity Vol. 2 No. 2 December 2006 pp. xx-xx  ISSN 1833-2595  
organisation resembles a classical bureaucracy (Hummel, 1977; Perrow, 1979), in 
which employees are interchangeable cogs, the less likely patronage is to flourish, 
and the more an organisation deals with clients or customers as in a perfect market, 
without discrimination on the basis of extraneous characteristics, the less frequent 
patronage will be. 
 
However, bureaucracies and markets seldom conform to theory — they routinely 
contain forms of bias, and indeed institutionalise them. For example, a university 
admissions system run purely on market principles to maximise income might give 
systematic advantage to children from wealthy families; if the student market is built 
around maximising the scores of incoming students, then a different bias exists. If the 
goal is giving equal opportunity to students on the basis of how they would perform 
under equal conditions, then yet a different bias — involving forms of affirmative 
action — would exist. 
 
The point here is that although there is a link between opposing patronage and 
bureaucratisation and marketisation, the rise of bureaucracy and markets does not 
automatically eliminate patronage. For example, it is well known that patriarchy easily 
coexists with bureaucracy and markets. Patronage needs to be examined on its own 
terms. 
 
In the past several decades, higher education in many countries has experienced 
increasing rationalisation, bureaucratisation and marketisation, partly as a result of 
massification, namely a vast expansion, and partly through competitive pressures 
linked to globalisation (Marginson & Considine, 2000). Whereas universities once 
served as upper-class entry to the ranks of lawyers and clergymen, they have now 
become closer to an extension of high school, a general screening and training venue 
for a wide range of occupations. This means that previous forms of academic 
patronage — notably on the grounds of gender, religion, class and ethnicity — are 
now more commonly opposed. On the other hand, commercialisation of higher 
education expands the role of a long-standing incentive for and tool of patronage: 
money. Departmental budgets, salaries, bonuses, salary increments, research grants, 
consulting fees and investment opportunities can be avenues for giving favours. 
 
Despite the continuing rationalising processes, universities contain many craft 
elements, especially at the research training level — supervision of research students 
is individualised. Likewise the appointment process is jealously guarded by local 
members of disciplines, who claim exclusive rights to judge the quality of others in 
their fields. These areas offer rich opportunities for patronage. Indeed, many would 
see a system without patronage as alien. 
 
Imagine an academic operation in which decisions are made without regard to the 
special characteristics of an individual, only their performance: 
 
• Papers submitted for publication would be blinded for referees, as is currently 
standard practice for many journals, especially in the humanities and social 
sciences. Furthermore, the author’s name would be hidden from the editor by 
use of an intermediary service, to limit the editor’s ability to select referees to 
give a preferred result. Alternatively, referees would be chosen using an 
algorithm, for example randomly from a bank of people in the field. Not only 
would the author’s name be removed from manuscripts as well as any self-
citations, but a textual anonymiser would be applied to hide peculiarities in 
style. For certain types of technical papers, method sections would be judged 
separately so that results would not bias referees. 
 
• Selection panels for posts would be entirely composed of strangers to the 
organisation. The selection committee might be asked to select the top 
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candidate, but not told the institution to which the applicant is being appointed. 
Interviews would be conducted electronically with the identity of applicants 
disguised by voice-modifying software. Curricula vitae would be anonymised by 
replacing achievements with generic equivalents, for example a degree from 
Stanford being listed as a degree from an A-level university — though some 
might argue that degrees should be ignored in favour of outputs — and a paper 
in Physical Review being listed as a paper in an A-ranked physics journal. 
Referees who know the candidate would be ruled out; referees might be 
chosen randomly from a panel, or refereeing replaced by a computer-based 
assessment of performance. 
 
• Applications for research grants would be scored by six to ten assessors. 
(Alternatively, applications would be given a score based on prior publication 
and other outputs by the applicant.) The median score would then be used to 
award a specified number of ballots in a grant lottery. For example, a median 
score of 80% might give 8 ballots and so forth. Grant recipients would be 
chosen using the lottery. 
 
What these sorts of hypothetical processes have in common is an attempt to eliminate 
the role of personal knowledge so that decisions are made using only information 
about performance. The result may seem absurd today, but perhaps no more absurd 
than attempts decades ago to eliminate bias on the basis of gender and other 
personal characteristics (which of course have not been entirely successful). In some 
places now, applicants for posts or grants do not have to reveal their gender, 
nationality, date of birth or marital status: these are considered irrelevant 
considerations in making a decision. When referees do not know the identity of a 
paper’s author, the gender of the author cannot easily play a difference in the 
referee’s response. 
 
Decision-making processes that eliminate knowledge of who applicants are will be 
opposed by those who want to control the selection process to ensure they are 
comfortable with the outcome. This is most common in selection for jobs: candidates 
are sought who will fit in, namely ones incumbents will feel comfortable with. 
Everyone wants to avoid having to work with a “difficult personality”. The trouble is 
that making compatibility an implicit criterion for appointees opens the door to a host 
of forms of patronage based on gender, age, discipline and personal style. 
 
Alternative futures 
 
The vision of academic life without patronage may or may not be attractive, 
depending on one’s location and values. In highly rationalised systems like 
Australia’s, getting rid of remaining patronage practices might be logical from a merit 
perspective, but brings the spectre of a fully bureaucratic, market-driven university in 
which academics have no power but are merely cogs in a soulless system that churns 
out graduates and research findings. Having the power to sponsor one’s students and 
choose one’s colleagues might seem to one of the few remaining academic privileges 
in market-driven higher education systems5. 
 
From the point of view of those excluded or subordinated by these privileges — for 
example the talented scholars who can not obtain jobs because competitors have 
patrons, or junior researchers who have to please team leaders in order to get ahead 
— any concerns by established academics about loss of their privileges might seem 
precious. Nevertheless, there is a deeper issue here: is there any way to reconcile the 
abolition of patronage with a workplace that maintains and strengthens collegiality and 
mutual support? If the only vision is McDonaldisation of higher education, the situation 
would be bleak. But there are other alternatives. Here I outline three. 
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One direction is diversity of institutions and units. Merit can apply within a unit, but 
units can have quite different goals and expectations. In Australia, all universities are 
quite similar in their standards, size, mix of disciplines and orientation to teaching and 
research. In the United States, in contrast, there is a much greater institutional 
diversity, ranging from elite research universities to community colleges, from 
enormous state universities to tiny places with only a few hundred students, from 
research institutions to liberal arts colleges, from mainstream educational approaches 
to radical alternatives. Among elite institutions, the expectations of academics at 
Sarah Lawrence College are quite different from those at Caltech. For students, the 
course structure at the University of Texas is different from that at Evergreen State 
College. The point of this example is not to hold up the US higher education system 
as a best practice model, as it has myriad problems, but to illustrate that institutional 
diversity is one possible future that could combine elimination of patronage with 
opportunity for collegiality and local control. 
 
However, it should be noted that anti-discrimination initiatives are antithetical to 
institutional diversity, and many would say rightly so, as when in the 1960s US federal 
funding was made contingent on desegregation. Institutional diversity, to be 
compatible with fairness, needs to provide equal opportunity system-wide, for 
example at equal-quality male-only and female-only units. The more usual pattern is a 
combination of diversity and unequal opportunity. 
 
Another alternative is an egalitarian educational model. Abbs and Carey (1977), for 
example, proposed a “new college” in which students and staff jointly make all 
decisions. In their vision, the curriculum and learning methods would be cooperatively 
decided, staff have equal salaries and status, and the small institution would be partly 
self-sustaining through practical work, for example growing food, in which everyone 
would participate. Abbs and Carey’s new college is the antithesis of market-driven 
uniformity: instead, staff and students are highly bonded in a common enterprise of 
learning. This model would not be attractive to many of today’s academics because it 
would mean giving up the privileges of salary and power over systems for student 
learning, but it could be deeply satisfying through personal engagement in meaningful 
processes for personal growth and mutual support. Egalitarian education, by 
eliminating academic privilege, eliminates many opportunities for patronage. 
 
A third alternative can be called community education in an intellectual commons. 
Students, rather than studying a formal syllabus, would develop their own learning 
plans, which might combine some formal instruction, some self-education (potentially 
drawing from online curricula) and some practical learning through work and 
community education, the latter in the spirit of Ivan Illich’s concept of deschooling 
(Illich, 1971). Research would include some traditional targeted projects and some 
collective enterprises along the lines of free software and Wikipedia (Surowiecki, 
2004). Scholars could combine in any way they pleased — for teaching or research — 
possibly in collaboration with students and amateurs. There is no standard funding 
model for this alternative: it could be based on projects or contracts, or based on a 
guaranteed annual income. The basic idea is that learning would be decoupled from 
the formal apparatus of courses and degrees and contributing to knowledge creation 
opened to anyone irrespective of training and credentials. 
 
These alternatives, however unlikely as images of the future, illustrate that intellectual 
activity can be organised in various ways that avoid the poles of patronage and 
hierarchical rationalisation. In each alternative, scholars would have the opportunity to 
engage with like-minded colleagues with some degree of collective control over their 
activities. But there is a penalty, at least in alternatives two and three: the status of 
academics would be considerably less. This is a pointer to the core dilemma facing 
any defence of patronage: in most fields, being a tenured academic is a privileged 
occupation, with many more capable aspirants than positions. 
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Challenges to patronage 
 
Patronage can be undermined in various ways. At the policy level, processes are 
crucial. Examples are journals setting up blind refereeing processes, thesis evaluation 
procedures ruling out certain examiners and job advertisements being written in a 
specified fashion. However, policies seldom cover all facets of a process. For 
example, even when journals use blind refereeing, the editor normally knows the 
identity of the author, can be influenced by author attributes such as their university 
affiliation, can select referees predisposed for or against a submission, and can 
interpret or overrule referee recommendations if desired. Seldom is there any 
oversight to deal with editor bias. No doubt most editors try to be objective but good 
intentions do not guarantee a fair outcome. 
 
Many organisations have policies about job selection, for example about the content 
of job advertisements and the membership of selection committees. But such policies 
only control some types of bias. Seldom do policies specify enough detail to prevent 
patronage. A typical scenario is that insiders want to appoint a particular person, often 
someone already in the position or sometimes a known external person. This can be 
facilitated by advertising a position in the person’s field, writing the advertisement in a 
way tailored to the person’s strengths, picking the selection committee to be 
sympathetic to the person or acquiescent to patrons of the person, manipulating the 
committee procedures to rule out competitors, and giving the desired candidate inside 
information about what to put in the application and say in the interview. Everything is 
done by the book but the job is stitched up. 
 
Policies and procedures are an important step in reducing patronage but just as 
important are attitudes and prevailing practices. Attitudes are crucial. Old-fashioned 
prejudice against out-groups needs to be replaced with personal sensitivity to possible 
bias. Instead of thinking how to give an advantage to friends and treasured 
colleagues, thinking might go along the lines of “I’d like them to succeed on their 
merits”. Instead of thinking how to wrangle a scholarship for a favoured student or a 
job for a mate, it would become more natural to think of all the other students and 
potential applicants out there — many not even known — who deserve a fair chance. 
 
Prevailing practices make an enormous difference to patronage. Even a single 
instance of apparent jobs-for-the-boys at the top of an organisation can set the tone 
for everyone else. Setting an example means doing things in a way that is seen to be 
fair as well as being fair. 
 
Patronage systems are easily entrenched: policies, attitudes and practices reinforce 
each other. Changing all of these simultaneously can be extraordinarily difficult. 
 
Examining theses: a case study 
 
In Australia, many undergraduate degrees require three years of full-time study, with 
an optional fourth year called honours designed for students seeking advanced 
training in a discipline6. The honours year normally includes coursework and a 
research component involving writing a thesis. Depending on the university and 
discipline, the thesis may comprise anything from 25% to 100% of the honours 
course; a typical length for a thesis comprising half the honours mark is 20,000 words. 
 
For students pursuing an academic career, honours is the most common route, and it 
is a crucial year: a first-class honours result is usually enough to obtain a PhD 
scholarship but anything less makes subsequent efforts much more difficult. The 
honours result therefore is a potential point of patronage: even a slight advantage to a 
student can make a career-changing difference. 
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Honours theses are usually supervised by a single academic in the field. Supervisors 
vary considerably in their talents and interest in their role. Some give day-to-day 
support in everything from thesis topic to grammar. Others take a more stand-offish 
attitude, letting the student sink or swim based on their own efforts. Some supervisors 
who take an intense personal interest in a student’s progress are grooming the 
student for success. This might be called patronage, especially when the student’s 
topic follows the supervisor’s research agenda or theoretical predilection. 
 
Honours theses are marked by examiners; patronage can occur via the choice of 
examiners. Consider the following possibilities: 
• Examiners are chosen randomly from a list of senior academics from other 
universities. These academics have no interest in supervising additional PhD 
students. 
• Examiners are chosen by a departmental committee from academics they know 
or know about at other universities. 
• Examiners are chosen by the supervisor from academics at other universities. 
• Examiners are chosen by a department committee from academics in their own 
department. 
• Examiners are chosen by the supervisor from colleagues. 
• The supervisor is an examiner. 
 
When the examiner has a closer relationship — actual or potential — to the student, 
patronage is easier to dispense. This is most obvious when the supervisor is an 
examiner: if the supervisor personally likes the student and expects that the student 
will follow the supervisor’s research path, then it is very difficult to avoid being 
supportive. (When the supervisor and student don’t see eye to eye or have had a 
falling out, having the supervisor as an examiner may disadvantage the student.) 
When a supervisor’s colleagues are examiners, they may be influenced by knowing 
the student personally, perhaps as a teacher in an undergraduate class, or influenced 
by their relationship with the supervisor. 
 
Examiners also can be influenced by their potential future relationships with students, 
most importantly by being a prospective PhD supervisor or, more generally, by being 
a like-minded person in the field, perhaps seeing the student down the track as 
someone to interact with as a postdoc, a colleague or an important researcher. If the 
student looks like fitting any of these roles, an examiner may feel extra affinity with the 
student and be a little bit more favourable in judging the thesis. 
 
In many cases, these considerations are not significant for career purposes, either 
because the student’s performance is not deemed as first-class by even the most 
sympathetic examiner or because the student’s performance is judged as outstanding 
by even the severest critics. Where bias plays the biggest role is at the margin, when 
a few extra marks make the difference between an honours result that garners a PhD 
scholarship and launches a research career and one that leads away from academia. 
 
Administratively, having supervisors as examiners can be said to be a conflict of 
interest. This is especially true when supervisors have had a strong input into deciding 
the thesis topic, assisting with data collection or analysis, and polishing the 
expression. How can supervisors be objective when assessing projects to which they 
have had considerable input? Having supervisors as examiners is also undesirable 
pedagogically, because students may be hesitant to be open about their doubts and 
difficulties, worrying that their supervisors may think less of their abilities. 
 
Being an examiner for one’s own student can be awkward. If I try to be scrupulously 
fair, I will take account of my own bias and, assuming I’m sympathetic to my student, 
try to counteract this bias by being a bit tougher than I would be with an unknown 
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student. But this creates a new unfairness. If I think my colleagues, examining the 
theses of their own honours students, are likely to give them an extra advantage or to 
be strong partisans on their behalf, then by being unbiased myself I’m actually 
disadvantaging my own student. For example, in writing a reference, if I say my 
student is in the top 25% while my colleagues rate their own students as in the top 
1%, I’ve penalised my student by being honest — or even by being partisan, just not 
as blatantly partisan as my colleagues. So to give my student a fair chance, I need to 
be partisan myself. These dilemmas disappear when examiners have no personal 
connections with students. 
 
At the University of Wollongong, in quite a few departments it used to be common for 
honours supervisors to be examiners. This was seen by some as a conflict of interest. 
Eventually a policy — driven by Deputy Vice-Chancellor Rob Castle, among others — 
was introduced specifying that supervisors could not be examiners. However, a 
couple of departments were so resistant to this policy that they changed the rules for 
their honours degrees, reducing the weight of the thesis component so it avoided the 
new regulation. Their argument was that only the supervisor had the unique specialist 
knowledge to be able to judge the thesis. 
 
Meanwhile, regulations for examination of higher degree theses at Wollongong have 
gradually been tightened to ensure that examiners are independent of the supervisor 
and student. Normally two examiners are chosen. For PhDs, both have to be outside 
the university and cannot be recent graduates. No one who has collaborated with the 
supervisor or student within the previous five years can be an examiner. A new rule is 
that a person cannot be used as an examiner more than once a year, intended to 
prevent research groups using a trusted ally to approve thesis after thesis. The 
guidelines for selecting examiners give the reason for these and related rules: the 
intention is to find people who are “at arm’s length from the supervisor/s and 
candidate so as to ensure the maximum degree of objectivity”. 
 
Another innovation at Wollongong has been to have research students involved in 
nominating examiners. The supervisor and student select four or five potential 
examiners and sign off on the names; the list has to be approved by the academic 
unit’s head of postgraduate studies. The supervisor and head of postgraduate studies 
then recommend two of those examiners to the director of the Research Student 
Centre, who will approve them if they meet all selection criteria in the university’s 
guidelines. One goal of this approach is to ensure that unsympathetic people are 
avoided: essentially, the supervisor and student each have a veto power. In earlier 
years, when the student was excluded from the process, with the examiners chosen 
by the supervisor or the department, there was greater scope for pressuring students 
to conform to the supervisor’s research orientation. This process of involving the 
student in examiner selection has recently been introduced at honours level. 
 
The Wollongong trajectory for thesis examination has been one of gradually excluding 
obvious conflicts of interest — especially examiners with strong connections with the 
supervisor — and involving students in the selection process. The current policies 
discourage patronage, ruling out supervisors and supervisors’ close colleagues as 
examiners. Obviously there is still scope for patronage: a supervisor and student 
could conspire to choose examiners who are friends or allies, but whose formal 
relationships are compatible with the guidelines. Nevertheless, the trend over the 
years has been to minimise opportunities for blatant patronage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The concept of patronage, taken in a very broad sense, can be used to capture many 
forms of bias, discrimination and conflict of interest. Academia is commonly seen as 
an arena in which merit plays a stronger role than in many other occupations. 
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Although challenges have been made to many forms of academic patronage — 
notably discrimination on grounds of gender and ethnicity — many others remain, 
often without much thought about problems or alternatives. 
 
A vision of academic life without patronage can sound utterly alien, for example with 
elaborate measures to ensure anonymity and independent judgement. To propose 
such measures may make one sound like a zealot and, more seriously, to be implicitly 
criticising one’s colleagues as not being objective. Furthermore, a fully rationalised 
university, run like a factory line, would be unattractive to the workers, for whom 
collegiality and a sense of common purpose make a huge difference. Reconciling 
elimination of patronage with satisfying work is a challenging task: possible directions 
include greater institutional diversity, small egalitarian cooperatives, and embedding 
scholarship in community activity. 
 
An important lesson from the experiences of academic patronage is how difficult it is 
to bring about change. One reason is straightforward: many academics want to retain 
their personal capacity to distribute favours, to friends, allies in their field and to 
students. Research teams are commonly built around powerful leaders who reward 
those committed to the research directions on which the leaders have built their 
reputations and sometimes those committed to the leaders personally. Sometimes 
such research empires are built on discrimination by gender, ethnicity or nationality, 
but even when these play little role, personal and professional favouritism can be 
significant. There have been major movements for sexual and racial equality but at 
the moment there seems to be no equivalent movement to challenge more personal 
forms of patronage. 
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End notes 
 
1It would be possible to analyse differences in patronage dynamics between 
academic and non-academic staff (or, in US terminology, between faculty and staff). 
Non-academic staff can dispense some favours, may have alliances with academics, 
be recipients of favours, and so forth. Characteristic relations between academic and 
non-academic staff depend on the unit and the higher education system. Because I 
approach the issue generally, I do not delve into such particularities.  
2I thank Kim Sawyer for this point.  
3I thank Kate Bowles for this point.  
4I thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
5I thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
6Four-year degrees are increasingly common, often with honours as part of the 
overall degree taking into account results in all four years. With such degrees, 
examination of the honours thesis or project is less crucial to the honours mark. 
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